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Impact of Institutional and Political Variables On Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing Countries
Abstract
Literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has been focusing on its traditional determinants for a long
time and lack of attention to institutional and political variables. However, in recent years, the pattern of
the world FDI flows is observed to show a shift away from developed countries towards developing
countries. Such shift is argued to be the result of the improvement in institutional qualities and political
stability in developing countries to make investment climate more appealing to foreign investors. The
impact of institutional qualities on FDI flows, however, have not been investigated by many studies in the
field of FDI. To address this shortcoming, this research studies the relationship between institutional and
political variables on FDI inflows in developing countries.
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Impact of Institutional and Political Variables On
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries
Jade Phung
I. Introduction
Literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has been focusing on its traditional
determinants for a long time and lack of attention to institutional and political variables. However,
in recent years, the pattern of the world FDI flows is observed to show a shift away from developed
countries towards developing countries. Such shift is argued to be the result of the improvement
in institutional qualities and political stability in developing countries to make investment climate
more appealing to foreign investors. The impact of institutional qualities on FDI flows, however,
have not been investigated by many studies in the field of FDI. To address this shortcoming, this
research studies the relationship between institutional and political variables on FDI inflows in
developing countries.
The process of globalization has accelerated rapidly over the last three decades. During the
period 1993 – 2015, the volume of world merchandise trade has increased by 103.3%, from $3.7
trillion in 1993 to $16 trillion in 2015. Surprisingly, the large increase in world trade volume does
not make trade the fastest growing channel of globalization. The flows of foreign direct
investment2, which refers to the type of investment made by multinational corporations to foreign
countries, soared by 107% from $220 billion in 1993 to $1.7 trillion in 2015, at a much faster
growth rate than volume of trade. Prior to 1990, the increase of inflows was mainly due to large
increase of investment to developed countries. However, after the 1990s, the growth of FDI
inflows into developing countries have gradually accelerated and contributed 55.5% to the world
foreign investment flows in 2014, surpassing the amount of investment into developed countries
to become the largest group countries of destination to world FDI inflows. The remarkable growth
rate of FDI flows into developing countries plays an important role in making FDI the fastest
growing channel of globalization and intrigues many scholars’ interest in explaining why
developing countries can attract such a large amount of foreign investment.
Empirical
research has supported the argument that large consumer base and trade liberalization in
developing countries are factors that attract foreign investment. Per Chakrabarti (2000), prior to
2000, most eminent empirical studies on FDI find that market size has significant impact on FDI
inflows into developing countries. Theoretically, market size is important in attracting foreign
direct investment because the largest component of world FDI stock, FDI in services, is gravitated
towards large consumer base developing countries. After 2000, using more advanced econometric
approaches, Al-Sadig (2009), Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, &
Mayer (2007), and Busse, & Hefeker (2007) also support the argument that market size is a
determinant of FDI. The rest of the world’s FDI inflows is FDI in manufacturing and primary
products. For instance, numerous foreign corporation located in North African countries take

Formal definition of FDI obtained from the World Bank is “the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of
the investor.”
2
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advantage of the region’s natural resources by exporting primary products back to their home
countries. Smartphones of Korean corporations, produced and assembled in South East Asian
countries, are exported to the targeted customer countries. Consequently, FDI in manufacturing
and primary products has gravitated towards developing countries with more liberalized trade
regimes. Even though prior to 2000, the empirical studies did not consistently find trade to be a
significant determinant of FDI, various recent research3 have provided empirical evidence that
countries with lower trade barriers attract more FDI (Chakrabarti., 2000).
Market size and trade, though predominantly found to be significant determinants of FDI
in developing countries, may not be the only determinants. Since 1990, despite having larger
consumer bases and more liberalized trade policy, developed countries have gradually receiving
less increase in FDI than developing countries have. Indeed, from 2013 to 2014, FDI flows to
developing countries decreases by approximately 28%4. Thus, with the improvement of
institutional qualities in developing countries, some studies5 suggest the rising importance of
political and institutional variables to attract FDI into developing countries. The UNCTAD 2015
World Investment Report emphasizes that the improvement in institutional qualities and political
stability in African countries draw an increase in FDI inflows to this region. Furthermore, since
institutional qualities and political stability are important elements of investment climate,
enhancement in institutional qualities and more stable political conditions such as enforcement of
property rights and control for corruption encourages foreign investors. Because those variables
have been introduced recently, there has not been much empirical research studying extensively
those determinants.
This research, therefore, is going to study the importance of institutional and political
variables in attracting FDI inflows to developing countries. I hypothesize that better institutional
qualities and less political risk and instability increase the FDI inflows into developing countries.
The study will apply pooled OLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation methods on two panel data
sets consisting of 40 developing countries during 4 different time periods to test the hypotheses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the theoretical
background and reviews related empirical studies. Then, the next section presents the data sets, the
choice of measurements, and descriptive statistics, followed by methodology section which
discusses estimation methods. The result section analyses the results of estimation, while the last
section concludes.
II. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
In macroeconomic studies, FDI is usually studied from the aspect of a source of capital to
boost the growth of a country. However, the study of FDI determinants are often based on
microeconomic theories. According to Dunning (1988), the characteristic of each foreign direct
investment varies by numerous factors, including the type of industry, source country, and the size
of the corporation. Thus, it is not possible to specify the determinants of FDI because different
factors have different level of importance to foreign direct investment depending on the type of
investment. However, the data for FDI by industries are not often available and difficult to gather,
especially data for investment in developing countries. The prominent theoretical framework
3

Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Al-Sadig (2009), and Busse & Hefeker (2007).
UNCTAD World Investment Report (2015)
5
Glass and Saggi (2002), Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007)
4
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proposed by Dunning (2002) introduces an approach to examine the determinants of FDI from a
macroeconomic perspective, which helps to overcome the unavailability of data.
The OLI paradigm, developed by Dunning (2002), consists of three key arguments, based
on the assumption of profit maximization by multinational corporations. Foreign firms, which own
competitive advantages such as innovative technology relatively to firms in the recipient countries,
have incentive to invest abroad (O - ownership advantage). If the transaction cost of outsourcing
to produce or distribute goods in foreign countries is higher than the cost of acquiring the business
and self-operating production process, firms have an incentive to internalize the intermediate
process to lower the cost (I – internalization advantage). Lastly, the investors are attracted to
countries that can provide them with locational advantages such as immobile production factors
(e.g. labor) and tax exemption (L – locational advantage). As political and institutional variables
are the locational advantages of developing countries to attract investors, the arguments for those
variables fit entirely in the L-location sub-paradigm. Furthermore, considering that in recent years
a large amount of FDI flows into developing countries, it is possible that the improvement of
political stability and institutional qualities in those countries play significant roles in attracting
investment.
Indeed, several established empirical studies have focused on testing whether political
variables are determinants of FDI. Those studies acknowledge that, theoretically and empirically,
political variables have significant impact on driving the flows of FDI. Busse and Hefeker (2007),
applying GMM methodology to a data set of 83 countries, test the hypothesis that political
instability has negative impact on FDI inflows to developing countries. The study finds that out of
12 variables, 10 of those are significant with the expected signs, concluding that developing
countries with higher political risk attract less FDI inflows. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and AlSadig (2009), which hypothesize that corruption has negative impact on FDI inflows to developing
countries, also find corruption to have significant and negative coefficients. Both studies utilize
two types of data set, a cross sectional and a panel, to confirm the hypothesis. The estimations of
empirical model for both data sets show that corruption has a negatively significant coefficient,
which confirms the robustness of their findings. Furthermore, Wei (2000), applying a modified
TOBIT model to a data set prior to 2000, finds that regardless of the type of source country,
corruption in recipient countries leads to a decline in FDI. Interestingly, the study by Jiménez
(2011) on the impact of corruption on FDI from Southern European countries to their neighboring
developing countries finds that corruption is significant but positive. The author argues that
corrupted governments are preferred by some investors because more corrupted government is
easier to bribe so the foreign firms can obtain looser regulations and more advantages.
Institutional variables, on the other hand, have not been extensively studied. Intellectual
property rights (IPR), an important component of institutional, are often considered a factor which
attracts FDI, especially in R&D and technological products, by creating a barrier to enter the
market for domestic firms in recipient countries. Contrary to this argument, Glass and Saggi
(2002), modeling the situation when IPR regulation is introduced in developing countries, finds
that IPR, indeed, discourages FDI. Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), using a cross
sectional model on a data set with 75 institutional qualities, concludes that institutional variables
are important determinant of FDI into developing countries. Through three steps of estimation to
correct for endogeneity and multicollinearity, some institutional variables are found to be
significant. Some of those are internal control of banks, intellectual property rights, easiness to
enter a market, employment contract protection, contract laws, guarantee of bank lending, and
information on the quality of goods and services. While the coefficient for IPR is significant and
90
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positive, unexpectedly labor law enforcement is also found to have negatively significant
coefficient. This indicates that developing countries with looser protection on labor are preferred
by foreign investors.
Some control variables are also included for our empirical model. Based on the survey by
Chakrabarti (2000), it is necessary to control for the market size of recipient countries. Following
the survey by Faeth (2009) and recent studies6 on FDI, I also consider infrastructure, trade, and
labor force as control variables, since those variables, which represent the locational advantages
of the recipient countries, are found in previous research to be significant determinants of FDI.
III. Data
Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) chooses bilateral FDI stock to be the dependent
variable. Similarly, Wei (2000) also uses bilateral FDI stock as the dependent variable. However,
since all independent variables in this research are measured annually in flows, I find FDI inflows
to be the better choice of measurement as the dependent variable. Furthermore, to neutralize large
country effect, the measurement of dependent variable is chosen to be FDI inflows as percentage
of GDP.
Following Busse & Hefeker (2007), I consider three political variables including
corruption, political risk, and government effectiveness. Corruption measurement is available in
the three data sets, the Institutional Profile, World Governance Indicator (WGI), and Corruption
Perception Index. The methodologies to determine the corruption level are different among those
data sets, but all the measurements have a high level of correlation. Thus, to gather the largest
number of observations, I choose the indicator Control of Corruption: Estimate7 of the WGI to be
the proxy for corruption. The only one indicator available as a proxy for political risk and
government effectiveness is provided by the WGI. Thus, the proxies for those are the indicators
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism and Government Effectiveness, respectively.
An aggregate index which evaluates institutional qualities is not available. However,
following the study by Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), this research obtains more than
70 measurements of institutional qualities from the Institutional Profile data set published by the
Ministry of French Finance. The advantage of using an individual measurement of each
institutional quality allows the study to specify which institutional quality has significant impact
on FDI. However, I also acknowledge that while all institutional qualities may impact FDI inflows,
it is not necessary one or a few institutional qualities will show significant influence. Thus, the
significance of institutional qualities may be diminished. Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007)
tests all 75 indicators using a cross sectional estimation for only one period due to data
unavailability. In this study, instead of examining all institutional qualities, I study 11 variables 8

6

Asiedu (2006); Ranjan & Agrawal (2011); Jiménez (2011); Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001).
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
(World Bank)
8
Those are Transparency of economic policy (fiscal, taxation, monetary, exchange-rate, etc), Government respect for
contracts, Settlement of economic disputes: justice in commercial matters, Administered prices and market prices,
Information on the situation of firms, Information on the quality of the goods: international norms and standards,
Intellectual property, Competition: productive sector: ease of market entry for new firms, Openness to foreign capital
and loans, Existence and observance of labor legislation and measures, and Employment contract protection
7
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found to be significant in Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) out of 16 to investigate whether
those variables are determinants of FDI in longer time span.
Control variables are obtained from the World Development Indicator of the World Bank.
Trade is measured by Exports plus imports (% of GDP), suggested by the previous studies9. The
proxies for market size, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and labor force are GDP per
capita (current US$), Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), Inflation, consumer prices
(annual %), and Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+),
respectively. The choice of those proxies follows the studies Asiedu (2006), Ranjan & Agrawal
(2011), Jiménez (2011), and Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001).
Table 1: Data Sources and Measurements
Determinant

Variable

Measurement

Abbreviation

Data
sources

FDI

Dependent

Foreign direct investment,
net inflows
(% of GDP)

FDIGDP

World
Bank

GDP

World
Bank

Government
Effectiveness

GDP per
GDP per capita (current
capita (current
US$)
$)
Inflation, consumer prices
Stability
(annual %)
Exports plus imports (% of
Trade level
GDP)
Mobile cellular
Infrastructure
subscriptions (per 100
capability
people)
Labor force participation
rate, total
Labor force
(% of total population ages
15+)
Political Stability and
Political risk
Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
Government
Government Effectiveness
effectiveness

Corruption

Corruption

Market Size
Macroeconomic
Factors
Trade Openness
Infrastructure

Labor Factors

Political Risk

Control for corruption

CPI
TRADE

World
Bank
World
Bank

MOBILE

World
Bank

LBFC

World
Bank

PVEST

World
Bank

GEE
CCEST

World
Bank
World
Bank

Since data for institutional variables are only available in three time periods, I consider two
different data sets. Both data sets use the same measurements for control and political variables.
However, the first data set has three time periods with time gap and includes institutional and
political variables, while the second data set only considers political variables with an extended
time span from 2002 to 2014. The first data set is limited to 40 countries, while the second data set
9
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contains 111 developing countries. Data are obtained from the Institutional Profile data set
collected by the Ministry of French Finance, the World Governance Indicator (WGI), and World
Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank. Table 1 presents the data sources, the measures
for each variable, and expected signs. Table 2 and 3 (in the appendix) present the descriptive
statistics.
IV. Methodology
The estimated equation for the first data set is as follows:
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑛 + 𝛽𝑚 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝜖
where INST, POL, and CONTROL are vectors of institutional, political, and control variables.
The second data set does not include institutional variables. Thus, I omit the vector INST to
estimate coefficients for the second data set.
In the first data set, since institutional variables are highly correlated to each other, it is not
possible to include several institutions in the same equation. Hence, I introduce each of the 11
institutional variables successively in a pooled OLS estimation. Despite neglecting the time and
cross-country effects, pooled OLS, comparing to fixed/random effects, can include the lagged
value of the dependent variable as independent variable to control for endogeneity. Furthermore,
to overcome the limitation of pooled OLS, time and region dummies are also incorporated into the
estimation equation. The exact estimation equation for this data set is as follow:
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑛 + 𝛽𝑚 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚+1 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑙𝑎𝑔 + 𝛽𝑝 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑝
+ 𝛽𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝜖
Since the second data set has a longer time span comparing to the first data set and includes
111 countries, generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation can be applied to effectively
account for endogeneity. This method instruments the first lag of the dependent variable with its
second and third lags. Thus, if the second and third lags of FDIGDP are not correlated with its
present values, endogeneity can be tackled using this method10. Due to the shorter T and longer N
of the second data set, the Arellano–Bond GMM estimator is preferred. The estimation equation
is as follow:
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝛽0 +𝛽𝑚 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝜖
Dependent variable: Foreign direct investment
Infrastructure
Market size
Macroeconomic stability
Level of trade openness
Labor force participation
Control for corruption
Political risk
Government effectiveness
10

Expected signs
+
+
+
+
+
+

Cameron & Trivedi (2009).
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V. Results
Table 4: Regression Results
First Data Set
Dependent Variable
FDIGDP
Pooled OLS
-.0001676
GDP
(-1.46)
.4750539
FDI lag
(2.11)**
.0004125
MOB
(0.04)
.0309989
TRADE
(2.04)**
.0534439
LBPART
(1.03)
-.0113116
CPI
(-0.30)
-.2315694
PVEST
(-0.48)
-.3446391
GEE
(-0.33)
1.133426
CCEST
(1.06)
Employment
-.7404039
Contract Protection
(-2.26)**
Constant
-1.342547
(-0.39)
Observations
151
Countries
40
Period
F – Test (model)/Wald test

2006 – 2012
3-year time gap
6.47***

Sargan test

Second Data Set
Arellano–Bond GMM
-.0005097
(-0.98)
.3613264
(1.92)*
.0181447
(1.70)*
-.0013564
(-0.07)
-.138242
(-0.80)
.0654122
(1.59)
-.311525
(-0.29)
3.344584
(1.99)**
-1.319436
(-1.02)

16.67337
(1.53)
1169
111
2002 – 2014
76.68***
484.8355***

R-Squared

0.4856
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation through cluster-robust
VCE estimators provided by STATA. t/z-values are in parentheses. Data sources and definitions of
variables are provided in Table 1. Region and time dummies are omitted from the table.
*Significance at the 10% level
**Significance at the 5% level
***Significance at the 1% level.
All the regression results for the different data sets are presented in Table 4. The first
column reports the pooled OLS regression results with the institutional variable being Employment
contract protection for the first data set. Surprisingly, the coefficients for all institutional variables
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are insignificant, except for employment contract protection that has a significant coefficient with
the expected sign.
Per Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), employment contract protection impedes
FDI since a loosely regulated labor market is considered a locational advantage of developing
countries. Intellectual property is found to have insignificant impact on FDI, consistent with the
model derived by Glass and Saggi (2002). Even though the result does not follow Bénassy‐Quéré,
Coupet, & Mayer (2007), since the previous study only considers a one period span, the results of
this research can overcome its cross-sectional bias. None of the political variables shows
significance, which indicates possible issue with multicollinearity and the absence of country
effects caused by the limitation of pooled OLS method. The coefficients for trade and lagged
FDIGDP are significant with expected signs, which imply that higher trade openness and FDI
inflows in the past positively increases the present level of FDI in developing countries.
The second column of Table 4 reports the Arellano–Bond GMM estimation for the second
data set. The coefficients for infrastructure and lagged FDI are significant with the expected signs.
However, trade openness is no longer a significant determinant of FDI. Of three political variables,
government effectiveness is the only variable with a significant coefficient with the expected sign.
Though control for corruption and political risk are not significant, all political variables are so
highly correlated that the significance of one variable may diminish the importance of others.
The regression results of both data sets indicate that market size, macroeconomic stability,
and labor force are not significant determinants of FDI. It is possible that since the lagged value
of FDI is included in the regression analysis the effect of those determinants is offset. Furthermore,
the choice of measurement for market size is not the best choice even though it has the most data
availability.
In short, the regression analysis of two data sets indicates that institutional qualities have
not been important determinants of FDI in developing countries though the results support that
employment contract protection has negative impact on FDI. On the other hand, consistent with
previous studies, political variables are found to be significant determinants of FDI. Stable politics
attracts more investment towards developing countries. The significance of trade openness and
mobile also reinforces their importance as determinants of FDI. Lastly, the past level of FDI
strongly impacts the present level of FDI in developing countries, which may explain the
continuous increase of FDI flows into developing countries and decrease of FDI flows into
developed countries.
VI. Conclusion
This study investigates the importance of institutional and political variables in driving
foreign direct investment into developing countries. Institutional variables are expected to be
important determinants of FDI in developing countries in recent decades, while political variables
have been found to be significant driver of FDI in previous studies. Then, by applying pooled OLS
and Arellano-Bond GMM methods on two data sets, I obtain the estimated coefficients. In contrast
to the original expectation, the regression results indicate that institutional variables are not
important determinants of FDI except for Employment contract protection. On the other hand,
political variables are found to be significant determinants of FDI, reinforcing the previous studies.
Trade openness, infrastructure, and past FDI level also impacts the flows of FDI to developing
countries strongly.
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Based on the results of this study, institutional qualities, though their importance to FDI is
growing in recent years, are still not primary drivers of FDI into developing countries. Future
research may extend the time span to reinvestigate the importance of institutional variables in FDI
in developing countries. Employment contract protection is found to be a negatively significant
determinant of FDI, suggesting possible future study on the impact of labor cost in FDI in
developing countries. Political variables are found to play important roles in determining FDI.
Thus, countries with less corrupted and more effective government attract more FDI. Lastly,
countries with more trade openness and better infrastructure are more appealing to investors.
Appendix
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (First Data Set)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. dev.
FDIGDP
1437
4.869248
6.736008
GDP
1440
3035.985
3133.17
MOB
1433
55.68188
43.32695
TRADE
1422
84.6888
38.96308
LBPART
1443
64.82155
11.255
CPI
1428
7.955685
17.70829
PVEST
1443
-.4536978
.8444521
GEE
1443
-.5141023
.5902153
CCEST
1443
-.548647
.5585557

Min
-8.400837
106.017
0
19.11879
37.8
-35.83668
-3.184814
-2.247729
-1.836495

Max
89.47596
23347.66
189.3831
321.6317
89.6
431.6998
1.41685
1.24741
1.274802

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Second Data Set)
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. dev.
FDIGDP
153
3.824812
4.067667
GDP
154
3740.413
3362.227
MOB
156
71.38221
40.91105
TRADE
152
71.664
31.99841
LBPART
156
64.0359
11.6425
CPI
156
6.63617
5.499749
PVEST
156
-.601439
.7874352
GEE
156
-.3522287
.5019549
CCEST
156
-.5215726
.4533292

Min
-3.751147
194.078
1.107029
22.10598
40.5
-2.248021
-2.691796
-1.492773
-1.42297

Max
26.49648
15154.47
185.8216
202.5777
88.7
36.7023
1.08013
1.196392
.9195152
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